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THE EVOLUTION PROBLEM ASSOCIATED WITH EIGENVALUES OF THE
HESSIAN
PABLO BLANC, CARLOS ESTEVE AND JULIO D. ROSSI
Abstract. In this paper we study the evolution problem

ut(x, t) − λj(D
2u(x, t)) = 0, in Ω× (0,+∞),
u(x, t) = g(x, t), on ∂Ω× (0,+∞),
u(x, 0) = u0(x), in Ω,
where Ω is a bounded domain in RN (that verifies a suitable geometric condition on its boundary)
and λj(D2u) stands for the j−st eigenvalue of the Hessian matrix D2u. We assume that u0 and
g are continuous functions with the compatibility condition u0(x) = g(x, 0), x ∈ ∂Ω.
We show that the (unique) solution to this problem exists in the viscosity sense and can be
approximated by the value function of a two-player zero-sum game as the parameter measuring
the size of the step that we move in each round of the game goes to zero.
In addition, when the boundary datum is independent of time, g(x, t) = g(x), we show that
viscosity solutions to this evolution problem stabilize and converge exponentially fast to the unique
stationary solution as t → ∞. For j = 1 the limit profile is just the convex envelope inside Ω of
the boundary datum g, while for j = N it is the concave envelope. We obtain this result with
two different techniques: with PDE tools and and with game theoretical arguments. Moreover,
in some special cases (for affine boundary data) we can show that solutions coincide with the
stationary solution in finite time (that depends only on Ω and not on the initial condition u0).
1. Introduction
Consider the problem
(1.1)


ut(x, t)− λj(D
2u(x, t)) = 0, in Ω× (0,+∞),
u(x, t) = g(x, t), on ∂Ω× (0,+∞),
u(x, 0) = u0(x), in Ω.
here Ω is a bounded domain in RN , with N ≥ 1 and λj(D
2u) stands for the j−th eigenvalue of
D2u = (∂2xi,xju)ij , which is the hessian matrix of u. We will assume from now on that u0 and g
are continuous functions with the compatibility condition u0(x) = g(x, 0), x ∈ ∂Ω.
Problem (1.1) is the evolution version of the elliptic problem
(1.2)
{
λj(D
2z(x)) = 0, in Ω,
z(x) = g(x), on ∂Ω,
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which was extensively studied in [1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 23, 24]. In particular, for j = 1 and j = N ,
problem (1.2) is the equation for the convex and concave envelope of g in Ω, respectively, i.e., the
solution z is the biggest convex (smallest concave) function u, satisfying u ≤ g (u ≥ g) on ∂Ω, see
[23, 24].
In [7], existence and uniqueness of a continuous solution for (1.2) is proved under a hypothesis
on the geometry of the domain. Moreover, from the results in [12] a comparison principle holds
for viscosity sub and supersolutions of (1.2). Using this comparison principle, together with the
connection with concave/convex envelopes of the boundary datum g for solutions to (1.2), the
geometric condition introduced in [7] turns out to be necessary and sufficient for the well posedness
of this problem in the viscosity sense. In our parabolic setting, using classical ideas from [10] one
can show that there is also a comparison principle. Hence, uniqueness of a viscosity solution follows.
Existence of solutions to (1.2) was shown in [12] using Perron’s method. A different existence proof
was given in [7] where the authors introduce a two-player zero-sum game whose value function
approximates the solution of the PDE as the size of the game step goes to zero.
For our parabolic problem, in order to show existence of a continuous viscosity solution it seems
natural to try to use Perron’s method relying on the comparison principle. However, we prefer to
take a different approach. We provide an existence proof using an approximation based on game
theory (this approach will be very useful since it allows us to gain some intuition that will be used
when dealing with the asymptotic behaviour of the solutions). For references concerning games
(Tug-of-War games) and fully nonlinear PDEs we refer to [3, 9, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27]
and to [11, 19] for parabolic versions. Here we propose a parabolic version of the game introduced
in [7] in order to show existence of a viscosity solution to (1.1). Like for the elliptic problem, it
is a two-player zero-sum game. The initial position of the game is determined by a token placed
at some point x0 ∈ Ω and at some time t0 > 0. Player I, who wants to minimize the final payoff,
chooses a subspace S of dimension j in RN and then, Player II, who wants to maximize the final
payoff, chooses a unitary vector v ∈ S. Then, for a fixed ε > 0, the position of the token is moved
to (x0 + εv, t0 − ε
2/2) or to (x0 − εv, t0 − ε
2/2) with equal probabilities. After the first round, the
game continues from the new position (x1, t1) according to the same rules. Notice that we take
t1 = t0 − ε
2/2, but x1 = x0 ± εv depends on a coin toss. The game ends when the token leaves
Ω× (0, T ].
A function h is defined outside the domain. For our purposes we choose h to be such that
h(x, t) = g(x, t) for x ∈ ∂Ω and t > 0, and h(x, 0) = u0(x) for x ∈ Ω. That is, h is a continuous
extension of the boundary data. We denote by (xτ , tτ ) the point where the token leaves the domain,
that is, either xτ 6∈ Ω with tτ > 0, or tτ ≤ 0. At this point the game ends and the final payoff is
given by h(xτ , tτ ). That is, Player I pays Player 2 the amount given by h(xτ , tτ ).
For Player I, we denote by SI a strategy, which is a collection of measurable mappings SI =
{Sk}
∞
k=0, where each mapping has the form
Sk : Ω
k+1 ×
(
kε2/2,+∞
)
−→ Gr(j,RN )
(x0, . . . , xk, t0) 7−→ S,
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where S is a subspace of dimension j. For Player II, a strategy SII is a collection of measurable
mappings SII = {Sk}
∞
k=0, where each mapping has the form
Sk : Ω
k+1 ×Gr(j,RN )×
(
kε2/2,+∞
)
−→ S
(x0, . . . , xk, S, t0) 7−→ v,
where v is a unitary vector in S.
Once both players chose their strategies, we can compute the expected value for the final payoff,
which we denote by
E
x0,t0
SI ,SII
[h(xτ , tτ )].
The value of the game for each player is the best expected value of the final payoff using one of
their respective strategies. Since Player I wants to minimize the final payoff and Player II wants to
maximize it, we can write the value of the game for each player as follows.
uεI(x0, t0) = inf
SI
sup
SII
E
x0,t0
SI ,SII
[h(xτ , tτ )], u
ε
II(x0, t0) = sup
SII
inf
SI
E
x0,t0
SI ,SII
[h(xτ , tτ )].
Observe that the expectations above are well defined since the number steps of the game is at most
⌈2t0/ε
2⌉, and therefore, the game ends in a finite number of steps with probability 1. For this game
it holds that uεI(x0, t0) = u
ε
II(x0, t0). Then, we define the value of the game as
uε(x0, t0) = u
ε
I(x0, t0) = u
ε
II(x0, t0).
In section 2 we prove that the game has a value uε(x, t) that verifies an equation (called the
Dynamic Programming Principle in the literature) and that uε(x, t) converges uniformly in Ω×[0, T ]
for every T > 0 to a function u(x, t), which is continuous and is the unique viscosity solution of the
problem (1.1). This is the content of our first result, see Theorem 1.1 below. For the convergence
of uε(x, t) we need to assume a condition on the domain that we impose from now on and reads as
follows: For every y ∈ ∂Ω, we assume that there exists r > 0 such that for every δ > 0 there exists
T ⊂ RN a subspace of dimension j, w ∈ RN of norm 1, λ > 0 and θ > 0 such that
(Fj) {x ∈ Ω ∩Br(y) ∩ Tλ : 〈w, x − y〉 < θ} ⊂ Bδ(y)
where
Tλ = {x ∈ R
N : d(x − y, T ) < λ}.
As in [7], for our game with a given j we will assume that Ω satisfies both (Fj) and (FN−j+1).
Notice that a uniformly convex domain verifies this condition for every j ∈ {1, .., N}, but more
general domains also satisfy this hypothesis, see [7].
Theorem 1.1. There is a value function for the game described before, uε. This value function
can be characterized as being the unique solution to the Dinamic Programing Principle (DPP)

uε(x, t) = inf
dim(S)=j
sup
v∈S,|v|=1
{
1
2
uε(x+ εv, t−
ε2
2
) +
1
2
uε(x− εv, t−
ε2
2
)
}
x ∈ Ω, t > 0,
uε(x, t) = h(x, t) x 6∈ Ω, or t ≤ 0.
Moreover, if Ω satisfies conditions (Fj) and (FN−j+1), there exists a function u ∈ C(Ω × [0,+∞)
such that
uε → u uniformly in Ω× [0, T ],
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as ε→ 0 for every T > 0. This limit u is the unique viscosity solution to

ut(x, t) − λj(D
2u(x, t)) = 0, in Ω× (0,+∞),
u(x, t) = g(x, t), on ∂Ω× (0,+∞),
u(x, 0) = u0(0), in Ω.
Once we proved existence and uniqueness of solutions, we focus on their asymptotic behaviour
as t→∞. We restrict our attention to the case where the boundary datum does not depend on t,
that is,
(1.3)


ut(x, t)− λj(D
2u(x, t)) = 0, in Ω× (0,+∞),
u(x, t) = g(x), on ∂Ω× (0,+∞),
u(x, 0) = u0(x), in Ω,
where u0 is a continuous function defined on Ω and g = u0|∂Ω.
Using PDE techniques, a comparison argument with super and sub solutions constructed using
an associated eigenvalue problem, we can show that u(x, t) converges exponentially fast to the
stationary solution. In the special case of j = 1 (or j = N) this result provides us with an
approximation of the convex envelope (or the concave envelope) of a boundary datum by solutions
to a parabolic problem.
Theorem 1.2. Let Ω ⊂ RN be an open bounded domain, and let u0 be a continuous function
defined on Ω and g = u0|∂Ω. Then, there exist two positive constants, µ > 0 (that depends on Ω)
and C (depending on the initial condition u0) such that the unique viscosity solution u of (1.3)
verifies
(1.4) ‖u(·, t)− z(·)‖∞ ≤ Ce
−µt,
where z is the unique viscosity solution of (1.2).
In addition, we also describe an interesting behavior of the solutions. Let us present our ideas in
the simplest case and consider the special case j = 1 with g ≡ 0, that is we deal with the problem

ut(x, t)− λ1(D
2u(x, t)) = 0, in Ω× (0,+∞),
u(x, t) = 0, on ∂Ω× (0,+∞),
u(x, 0) = u0, in Ω.
Notice that in this case z ≡ 0 and from Theorem 1.2 we have that u(x, t) → 0 exponentially fast,
−Ce−µt ≤ u(x, t) ≤ Ce−µt. In this scenario we can improve the upper bound. We show that there
exists a finite time T > 0 depending only on Ω, such that the solution satisfies u(x, t) ≤ 0, for any
t > T . This is a consequence of the fact that the eigenvalue problem
(1.5) − λ1(D
2ϕ(x)) = µϕ(x), in Ω,
admits a positive solution for any µ > 0 whenever Ω is bounded. In particular, this result says that,
for g ≡ 0 and j = 1, there exists T > 0 such that the solution of (1.1) is below the convex envelope
of g in Ω for any time beyond T . In fact, the same situation occurs when g is an affine function
(we just apply the same argument to u˜ = u− g). When we consider j = N and an affine function
g, we have the analogous behavior, i.e. there exists T > 0 such that the solution of (1.1) is above
the concave envelope of g in Ω for any time beyond T . However, the situation is different when
one considers 1 < j < N . In this case, equation (1.5) admits a positive and a negative solution for
any µ > 0, and therefore, it is possible to prove the existence of T > 0, depending only on Ω, such
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that u(x, t) = z(x), for any t > T , where z is the solution of (1.2). We sum up these results in the
following theorem.
Theorem 1.3. Let Ω ⊂ RN be an open bounded domain. Let g be the restriction of an affine
function to ∂Ω and u0 a continuous function in Ω. If u(x, t) is the viscous solution of (1.3) and
z(x) is the affine function (that turns out to be the viscous solution of (1.2)), then there exists
T > 0, depending only on Ω, such that
(i) If j = 1, then u(x, t) ≤ z(x), for any t > T .
(ii) If j = N , then u(x, t) ≥ z(x), for any t > T .
(iii) If 1 < j < N , then u(x, t) = z(x), for any t > T .
Notice that (iii) says that for 1 < j < N and an affine boundary datum we have convergence to
the stationary solution in finite time.
Although this result implies that for some situations the exponential decay given in Theorem 1.2
is not sharp, we will also describe some other situations (with boundary data that are not affine
functions) for which the solution u(x, t) does not fall below or above the convex or concave envelope
in finite time.
In this final part of the paper we also look at the asymptotic behaviour of the values of the
game described above and show that there exists µ > 0, a constant depending only on Ω, and C
independent of ε such that
‖uε(·, t)− zε(·)‖∞ ≤ Ce
−µt,
being uε the value function for the game and zε a stationary solution to de (DPP). Note that from
here we can provide a different proof (using games) of Theorem 1.2. We also provide a new proof
of Theorem 1.3 using game theoretical arguments. With these techniques we can obtain a similar
result in the case that g coincide with an affine function in a half-space.
Moreover, thanks to the game approach we can show a more bizarre behaviour in a simple
configuration of the data. Consider the equation ut = λj(D
2u). Let Ω be a ball centered at the
origin, Ω = BR ⊂ R
N , and call (x′, x′′) ∈ Rj × RN−j. Assume that the boundary datum is given
by two affine functions (for example, take g(x′, x′′) = |x′′|, for (x′, x′′) ∈ RN \ Ω) and the initial
condition is strictly positive inside Ω, u0 > 0. For this choice of g, we have that the stationary
solution satisfies z(x′, x′′) = 0 in Ω ∩ {x′′ = 0}. In this configuration of the data we have that for
every point x0 in the segment {x
′′ = 0} ∩ Ω, we have
u(x0, t) > 0 = z(x0)
for every t > 0. However, for any point x0 outside the segment {x
′′ = 0} ∩ Ω, there exists a finite
time t0 (depending on x0) such that
u(x0, t) = z(x0)
for every t > t0.
That is, the solution to the evolution problem eventually coincides with the stationary solution
outside the segment {x′′ = 0} ∩ Ω, but this fact does not happens on the segment.
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The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we collect some preliminaries and we use the
game theoretical approach to obtain existence of solutions; finally, in section 3 we deal with the
asymptotic behaviour of the solutions.
2. Games
2.1. Preliminaries on viscosity solutions and a comparison principle. We begin by stating
the usual definition of a viscosity solution to (1.1).
Definition 2.1. A function u : ΩT := Ω× (0,+∞)→ R verifies
ut − λj(D
2u) = 0
in the viscosity sense if the lower and upper semicontinuous envelopes of u given respectively by
u∗(x, t) = sup
r>0
inf{u(y, s); y ∈ Br(x), |s− t| < r},
u∗(x, t) = inf
r>0
sup{u(y, s); y ∈ Br(x), |s− t| < r},
satisfy
(i) for every φ ∈ C2(ΩT ) such that u∗ − φ has a strict minimum at the point (x, t) ∈ ΩT with
u∗(x, t) = φ(x, t), we have
φt(x, t) − λj(D
2φ(x, t)) ≥ 0.
(ii) for every ψ ∈ C2(ΩT ) such that u
∗−ψ has a strict maximum at the point (x, t) ∈ ΩT with
u∗(x, t) = ψ(x, t), we have
ψt(x, t)− λj(D
2ψ(x, t)) ≤ 0.
From our results we will obtain a solution that is continuous in the whole ΩT and hence we can
avoid the use of u∗ and u∗ in what follows.
Comparison holds for our equation, see Theorem 8.2 from [10]. Let u be a supersolution, that
is, it verifies
(2.1)


ut(x, t)− λj(D
2
xu(x, t)) ≥ 0, in Ω× (0,+∞),
u(x, t) ≥ g(x, t), on ∂Ω× (0,+∞),
u(x, 0) ≥ u0(x), in Ω,
and u be a subsolution, that is,
(2.2)


ut(x, t)− λj(D
2
xu(x, t)) ≤ 0, in Ω× (0,+∞),
u(x, t) ≤ g(x, t), on ∂Ω× (0,+∞),
u(x, 0) ≤ u0(x), in Ω.
Notice that the inequalities ut(x, t)−λj(D
2
xu(x, t)) ≥ 0 and ut(x, t)− λj(D
2
xu(x, t)) ≤ 0 are under-
stood in the viscosity sense (see Definition 2.1), while the other inequalities (that involve bound-
ary/initial data) are understood in a pointwise sense.
Lemma 2.2. Let u and u verify (2.1) and (2.2) respectively, then
u(x, t) ≥ u(x, t)
for every (x, t) ∈ Ω× (0,+∞).
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As an immediate consequence of this result uniqueness of continuous viscosity solutions to our
problem (1.1) follows.
2.2. Existence using games. Let Ω ⊂ RN be a bounded open set and T > 0. We define
ΩT = Ω × (0, T ]. Two values, ε > 0 and j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, are given. The game under consideration
is a two-player zero-sum game that is played in the domain ΩT . Initially, a token is placed at some
point (x0, t0) ∈ ΩT . Player I chooses a subspace S of dimension j and then Player II chooses one
unitary vector, v, in the subspace S. Then the position of the token is moved to (x0 ± εv, t0 −
ε2
2 )
with equal probabilities. After the first round, the game continues from (x1, t1) according to the
same rules. This procedure yields a sequence of game states
(x0, t0), (x1, t1), . . .
where every xk is a random variable. The game ends when the token leaves ΩT , at this point the
token will be in the parabolic boundary strip of width ε given by
ΓεT =
(
Γε ×
[
−
ε2
2
, T
])
∪
(
Ω×
[
−
ε2
2
, 0
])
where
Γε = {x ∈ RN \ Ω : dist(x, ∂Ω) ≤ ε}.
We denote by (xτ , tτ ) ∈ Γ
ε
T the first point in the sequence of game states that lies in Γ
ε
T , so that
τ refers to the first time we hit ΓεT . At this time the game ends with the final payoff given by
h(xτ , tτ ), where h : Γ
ε
T → R is a given continuous function that we call payoff function. Player I
earns −h(xτ , tτ ) while Player II earns h(xτ , tτ ) (recall that this game is a zero-sum game). For our
purposes we choose
(2.3) h(x, t) =
{
g(x, t), x ∈ ∂Ω, t > 0,
u0(x), x ∈ Ω, t = 0.
A strategy SI for Player I, the player seeking to minimize the final payoff, is a function defined
on the partial histories that at every step of the game gives a j−dimensional subspace S
SI(t0, x0, x1, . . . , xk) = S ∈ Gr(j,R
N ).
A strategy SII for Player II, who seeks to maximize the final payoff, is a function defined on the
partial histories that at every step of the game gives a unitary vector in a prescribed j−dimensional
subspace S
SII(t0, x0, x1, . . . , xk, S) = v ∈ S.
When the two players fix their strategies SI and SII we can compute the expected outcome as
follows: Given the sequence (x0, t0), (x1, t1), . . . , (xk, tk) in ΩT , the next game position is distributed
according to the probability
piSI,SII((x0, t0), (x1, t1), . . . , (xk, tk), A) =
1
2
δ
(xk+εv,tk−
ε2
2
)
(A) +
1
2
δ
(xk−εv,tk−
ε2
2
)
(A),
for all A ⊂ ΩT ∪ Γ
ε
T , where v = SII(t0, x0, x1, . . . , xk, SI(t0, x0, x1, . . . , xk)). By using the one step
transition probabilities and Kolmogorov’s extension theorem, we can build a probability measure
P
x0,t0
SI,SII
on the game sequences for which the initial position is (x0, t0), that we callH
∞. The expected
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payoff, when starting from (x0, t0) and using the strategies SI, SII, is then computed according to
this probability as
(2.4) Ex0,t0SI,SII [h(xτ , tτ )] =
∫
H∞
h(xτ , tτ ) dP
x0,t0
SI,SII
.
The value of the game for Player I is define as
uεI (x0, t0) = inf
SI
sup
SII
E
x0,t0
SI,SII
[h(xτ , tτ )]
while the value of the game for Player II as
uεII(x0, t0) = sup
SII
inf
SI
E
x0,t0
SI,SII
[h(xτ , tτ )] .
Intuitively, the values uεI (x0, t0) and u
ε
II(x0, t0) are the best expected outcomes each player can
expect when the game starts at (x0, t0). If these two values coincide, u
ε
I = u
ε
II, we say that the
game has a value.
Let us observe that the game ends after at most a finite number of steps, in fact, we have
τ ≤
⌈
2T
ε2
⌉
.
Hence, the expected value computed in (2.4) is well defined.
To see that the game has a value, we can consider uε, a function that satisfies the Dynamic
Programing Principle (DPP) associated with this game, that is given by

uε(x, t) = inf
dim(S)=j
sup
v∈S,|v|=1
{
1
2
uε
(
x+ εv, t−
ε2
2
)
+
1
2
uε
(
x− εv, t−
ε2
2
)}
(x, t) ∈ ΩT ,
uε(x, t) = h(x, t) (x, t) 6∈ ΩT .
The existence of such a function can be seen defining the function backwards in time. In fact, given
h(x, t) we can compute uε(x, t) for 0 < t < ε
2
2 using the (DPP) and then continue with u
ε for
ε2
2 ≤ t < 2
ε2
2 , etc.
Now, we want to prove that a function that verifies the (DPP) uε, is in fact the value of the
game, that is, it holds that uε = uεI = u
ε
II. We know that u
ε
II ≤ u
ε
I , to obtain the equality, we will
show that uε ≤ uεII and u
ε
I ≤ u
ε.
Given uε a function that verifies the (DPP) and η > 0, we can consider the strategy S0II for
Player II that at every step almost maximize uε(xk + εv, tk −
ε2
2 ) + u
ε(xk − εv, tk −
ε2
2 ), that is
S0II(t0, x0, x1, . . . , xk, S) = w ∈ S
such that
1
2
uε(xk + εw, tk −
ε2
2
) +
1
2
uε(xk − εw, tk −
ε2
2
) ≥
sup
v∈S,|v|=1
{
1
2
uε(xk + εv, tk −
ε2
2
) +
1
2
uε(xk − εv, tk −
ε2
2
)
}
− η2−(k+1)
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We have
E
x0,t0
SI,S0II
[uε(xk+1, tk+1)− η2
−(k+1)|x0, . . . , xk]
≥ inf
S,dim(S)=j
sup
v∈S,|v|=1
{
1
2
uε(xk + εv, tk −
ε2
2
) +
1
2
uε(xk − εv, tk −
ε2
2
)
}
− η2−(k+1) − η2−(k+1)
≥ uε(xk, tk)− η2
−k,
where we have estimated the strategy of Player I by inf and used that uε satisfies the (DPP). Thus
Mk = u
ε(xk, tk)− η2
−k
is a submartingale. Now, we have
uεII(x0, t0) = sup
SII
inf
SI
E
x0,t0
SI,SII
[h(xτ , tτ )]
≥ inf
SI
E
x0,t0
SI,S0II
[h(xτ , tτ )]
≥ inf
SI
E
x0,t0
SI,S0II
[Mτ ]
≥ inf
SI
E
x0,t0
SI,S0II
[M0] = u
ε(x0, t0)− η,
where we used the optional stopping theorem for Mk. Since η is arbitrary small, this proves that
uεII ≥ u
ε. Analogously, we can consider a strategy S01 for Player I to prove that u
ε ≥ uεI . This
shows that the game has a value that can be characterized as the solution to the (DPP).
Our next aim now is to pass to the limit in the values of the game
uε → u
as ε→ 0 and obtain in this limit process a viscosity solution to (1.1).
We will use the following Arzela-Ascoli type lemma, to obtain a convergent subsequence uε → u.
For its proof we refer to Lemma 4.2 from [21].
Lemma 2.3. Let {uε : Ω× [0, T ]→ R, ε > 0} be a set of functions such that
(i) there exists C > 0 such that |uε(x, t)| < C for every ε > 0 and every (x, t) ∈ Ω× [0, T ],
(ii) given η > 0 there are constants r0 and ε0 such that for every ε < ε0 and any x, y ∈ Ω with
|x− y| < r0 and for every t, s ∈ [0, T ] with |t− s| < r0 it holds
|uε(x, t)− uε(y, s)| < η.
Then, there exists a uniformly continuous function u : Ω × [0, T ] → R and a subsequence still
denoted by {uε} such that
uε → u uniformly in Ω× [0, T ],
as ε→ 0.
So, our goal now is to show that the family uε satisfies the hypotheses of the previous lemma.
First, let us observe that
minh ≤ uε(x, t) ≤ maxh
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for every (x, t) ∈ Ω × [0, T ]. To prove that uε satisfies the second condition in Lemma 2.3 we will
have to make some geometric assumptions on the domain. As in [7], given y ∈ ∂Ω we assume that
there exists r > 0 such that for every δ > 0 there exists T ⊂ RN a subspace of dimension j, w ∈ RN
of norm 1, λ > 0 and θ > 0 such that
(Fj) {x ∈ Ω ∩Br(y) ∩ Tλ : 〈w, x − y〉 < θ} ⊂ Bδ(y)
where
Tλ = {x ∈ R
N : d(x − y, T ) < λ}.
For our game with a fixed j we will assume that Ω satisfies both (Fj) and (FN−j+1). As we
mentioned in the introduction, observe that every strictly convex domain verifies (Fj) for any
1 ≤ j ≤ N .
The key point to obtain the asymptotic equicontinuity required in the second condition in Lemma
2.3 is to obtain the bound for (x, t) ∈ ΩT and (y, s) ∈ Γ
ε
T . For the case (x, t), (y, s) ∈ Γ
ε
T the bound
follows from the uniform continuity of h in ΓεT . For the case (x, t), (y, s) ∈ ΩT we argue as follows.
We fix the strategies SI, SII for the game starting at (x, t). We define a virtual game starting at
(y, s) using the same random steps as the game starting at (x, t). Furthermore, the players adopt
their strategies SI, SII from the game starting at (x, t), that is, when the game position is (yk, sk) a
player make the choices that would have taken at (xk, tk) while playing the game starting at (x, t).
We proceed in this way until for the first time one of the positions leave the parabolic domain, that
is, until (xk, tk) ∈ Γ
ε
T or (yk, sk) ∈ Γ
ε
T . At that point we have |(xk, tk)− (yk, sk)| = |(x, t)− (y, s)|,
and the desired estimate follow from the one for for xk, yk ∈ Γε (in the case that both positions
leave the domain at the same turn, k) or xk ∈ Ω, yk ∈ Γε (if only one have leaved the domain).
Thus, we can concentrate on the case (x, t) ∈ ΩT and (y, s) ∈ Γ
ε
T . We can assume that (y, s) ∈
∂PΩT . If we have the bound for those points we can obtain a bound for a point (y, s) ∈ Γ
ε
T just by
considering (z, u) ∈ ∂PΩT close to (x, t) and (y, s). If s < 0, we can consider the point (x, 0) and
for y 6∈ Ω we can consider (z, t) with z ∈ ∂Ω a point in the line segment that joins x and y.
Hence, we have to handle two cases. In the first one we have to prove that |uε(x, t)−uε(x, 0)| < η
for x ∈ Ω and 0 < t < r0. In the second one we have to prove that |u
ε(x, t) − uε(y, t)| < η for
x ∈ Ω, y ∈ ∂Ω such that |x− y| < r0 and 0 < t ≤ T .
In the first case we have
uε(x, 0) = u0(x),
we have to show that the game starting at (x, t) will not end too far a way from (x, 0). We have
− ε
2
2 < tτ < t, so we have to obtain a bound for |x−xτ |. To this end we considerMk = |xk−x|
2−ε2k.
We have
E
x,t
SI ,SII
[|xk+1 − x|
2 − ε2(k + 1)|x, x1, . . . , xk]
=
|xk + εvk − x|
2 + |xk − εvk − x|
2
2
− ε2(k + 1)
= |xk − x|
2 + ε2|vk|
2 − ε2(k + 1)
=Mk.
(2.5)
Hence, Mk is a martingale. By applying the optional stopping theorem, we obtain
(2.6) Ex,tSI ,SII [|xτ − x|
2] = ε2Ex,tSI ,SII [τ ] ≤ ε
2
⌈
2t
ε2
⌉
≤ ε2
⌈
2r0
ε2
⌉
≤ ε2 + 2r0 ≤ ε
2
0 + 2r0
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Hence, using
E
x,t
SI ,SII
[|xτ − x|
2] ≥ P(|(xτ , tτ )− (x, 0)| ≥ δ)δ
2,
we obtain
P(|(xτ , tτ )− (x, 0)| ≥ δ) ≤
ε20 + 2r0
δ2
.
With this bound, we can obtain the desired result as follows:
|uε(x, t) − h(x, 0)| ≤ P(|(xτ , tτ )− (x, 0)| < δ)× sup
(xτ ,tτ )∈Bδ(x,0)
|h(xτ , tτ )− h(x, 0)|
+ P(|(xτ , tτ )− (x, 0)| ≥ δ))2max |h|
≤ sup
(xτ ,tτ )∈Bδ(x,0)
|h(xτ , tτ )− h(x, 0)|+
(ε20 + 2r0)2max |h|
δ2
< η
(2.7)
if δ, ε0 and r0 are small enough.
Now we move to the second case, we have uε(y, s) = g(y, s), Here, we need to make the geometric
assumptions (Fj) and (FN−j+1) on ∂Ω. In this parabolic game we have an extra difficulty compared
with the elliptic case treated in [7], we have to make an extra effort to bound the amount of time
that it takes for the game to end.
We start with the case j = 1, in this case we assume (FN ). This condition reads as follows: For
every y ∈ ∂Ω we assume that there exists r > 0 such that for every δ > 0 there exists w ∈ RN of
norm 1 and θ > 0 such that
(2.8) {x ∈ Ω ∩Br(y) : 〈w, x− y〉 < θ} ⊂ Bδ(y).
Let us observe that for any possible choice of the direction v at every step we have that the
projection of the position of the game, xn, in the direction of a fixed unitary vector w, that is,
〈xn − y, w〉 ,
is a martingale. We fix r > 0 and consider τ˜ , the first time x leaves Ω or Br(y). Hence
(2.9) E 〈xτ˜ − y, w〉 ≤ 〈x− y, w〉 ≤ d(x, y) < r0.
We consider the vector w given by the geometric assumption on Ω, we have that
〈xn − y, w〉 ≥ −ε.
Therefore, (2.9) implies that
P
(
〈xτ˜ − y, w〉 > r
1/2
0
)
r
1/2
0 −
(
1− P
(
〈xτ˜ − y, w〉 > r
1/2
0
))
ε < r0.
Hence, we have (for every ε > ε0 small enough)
P
(
〈xτ˜ − y, w〉 > r
1/2
0
)
< 2r
1/2
0 .
Then, (2.8) implies that given δ > 0 we can conclude that
P(d(xτ˜ , y) > δ) < 2r
1/2
0 .
by taking r0 small enough and an appropriate w.
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Hence, d(xτ˜ , y) ≤ δ with probability close to one, and in this case the point xτ˜ is actually the
point where the process has leaved Ω, that is τ˜ = τ . When d(xτ , y) ≤ δ, by the same martingale
argument used in (2.6), we obtain
E[t− tτ ] = E
[
ε2
2
τ
]
=
E[|xτ − x|
2]
2
≤
δ2
2
.
Hence,
P(t− tτ > δ) ≤
δ
2
and the bound follows as in (2.7).
In the general case, for any value of j, we can proceed in the same way. In order to be able to
use condition (Fj), we have to argue that the points xn involved in our argument belong to Tλ. For
r0 < λ we have that x ∈ Tλ, so if we ensure that at every move v ∈ T we will have that the game
sequence will be contained in x+ T ⊂ Tλ.
Recall that here we are assuming that both (Fj) and (FN−j+1) are satisfied. We can separate
the argument into two parts. We will prove on the one hand that uε(x, t)− g(y, s) < η and on the
other that g(y, s) − uε(x, t) < η. For the first inequality we can make choices for the strategy for
Player I, and for the second one we can do the same for strategies of Player II.
Since Ω satisfies condition (Fj), Player I can make sure that at every move the vector v belongs
to T by selecting S = T . This proves the upper bound uε(x, t) − g(y, s) < η. On the other hand,
since Ω satisfies (FN−j+1), Player II will be able to select v in a space S of dimension j and hence
he can always choose v ∈ S ∩ T since
dim(T ) + dim(S) = N − j + 1 + j = N + 1 > N.
This shows the lower bound g(y, s)− uε(x, t) < η.
We have shown that the hypotheses of the Arzela-Ascoli type lemma, Lemma 2.3, are satisfied.
Hence we have obtained uniform convergence of a subsequence of uε.
Lemma 2.4. Let Ω be a bounded domain in RN satisfying conditions (Fj) and (FN−j+1). Then
there exists a subsequence of uε that converges uniformly. That is,
uεj → u, as εj → 0,
uniformly in Ω× [0, T ], where u is a uniformly continuous function.
Now, let us prove that any possible uniform limit of uε is a viscosity solution to the limit PDE
problem. This result shows existence of a continuous up to the boundary solution defined in Ω×[0, T ]
for every T > 0. Uniqueness of this viscosity solution follows from the comparison principle stated
in Lemma 2.2.
Theorem 2.5. Let u be a uniform limit of the values of the game uε. Then u is a viscosity solution
to (1.1).
Proof. First, we observe that since uε = g on ∂Ω× (0, T ) and uε(x, 0) = u0(x) for x ∈ Ω, we obtain,
from the uniform convergence, that u = g on ∂Ω × (0, T ) and u(x, 0) = u0(x) for x ∈ Ω. Also,
notice that Lemma 2.3 gives that the limit function is continuous.
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To check that u is a viscosity supersolution to λj(D
2u) = 0 in Ω, let φ ∈ C2(ΩT ) be such that
u− φ has a strict minimum at the point (x, t) ∈ ΩT with u(x, t) = φ(x, t). We need to check that
φt(x, t) − λj(D
2φ(x, t)) ≥ 0.
As uε → u uniformly in Ω× [0, T ] we have the existence of two sequences xε, tε such that xε → x,
tε → t as ε→ 0 and
uε(z, s)− φ(z, s) ≥ uε(xε, tε)− φ(xε, tε)− ε
3
(remark that uε is not continuous in general). Since uε is a solution to
uε(x, t) = inf
dim(S)=j
sup
v∈S,|v|=1
{
1
2
uε
(
x+ εv, t−
ε2
2
)
+
1
2
uε
(
x− εv, t−
ε2
2
)}
we obtain that φ verifies
(2.10)
φ(xε, tε)− φ
(
xε, tε −
ε2
2
)
≥ inf
dim(S)=j
sup
v∈S,|v|=1
{
1
2
φ
(
xε + εv, tε −
ε2
2
)
+
1
2
φ
(
xε − εv, tε −
ε2
2
)
− φ
(
xε, tε −
ε2
2
)}
− ε3.
Now, consider the second order Taylor expansion of φ (to simplify the notation we omit the
dependence of t here)
φ(y) = φ(x) +∇φ(x) · (y − x) +
1
2
〈D2φ(x)(y − x), (y − x)〉+ o(|y − x|2)
as |y − x| → 0. Hence, we have
φ(x + εv) = φ(x) + ε∇φ(x) · v + ε2
1
2
〈D2φ(x)v, v〉 + o(ε2)
and
φ(x− εv) = φ(x) − ε∇φ(x) · v + ε2
1
2
〈D2φ(x)v, v〉 + o(ε2).
Using these expansions we get
1
2
φ(xε + εv) +
1
2
φ(xε − εv)− φ(xε) =
ε2
2
〈D2φ(xε)v, v〉 + o(ε
2).
Plugging this into (2.10) and dividing by ε2/2, we obtain
φ(xε, tε)− φ
(
xε, tε −
ε2
2
)
ε2/2
≥ inf
dim(S)=j
sup
v∈S,|v|=1
{
〈D2φ(xε, tε − ε
2/2)v, v〉+ 2
o(ε2)
ε2
}
− 2ε.
Therefore, passing to the limit as ε→ 0 in (2.10) we conclude that
φt(x, t) ≥ inf
dim(S)=j
sup
v∈S,|v|=1
{
〈D2φ(x, t)v, v〉
}
.
which is equivalent to
φt(x, t) ≥ λj(D
2φ(x))
as we wanted to prove.
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When we consider a smooth function ψ that touches u from above, we can obtain the reverse
inequality in a similar way. 
Remark 2.6. From the uniqueness of viscosity solutions to the limit problem (recall that a com-
parison principle holds) we obtain that the convergence of the whole family uε. That is,
uε → u
uniformly as ε → 0 (not only along subsequences). Hence, we have completed the proof of Theo-
rem 1.1.
3. Asympitotic behaviour
Along this section we restrict our attention to the case where the boundary condition does not
depend on the time, that is,

ut(x, t)− λj(D
2
xu(x, t)) = 0, in Ω× (0,+∞),
u(x, t) = g(x), on ∂Ω× (0,+∞),
u(x, 0) = u0(0), in Ω.
where u0 is a continuous function defined on Ω and g = u0|∂Ω.
We want to study the asymptotic behaviour as t→∞ of the solution to this parabolic equation.
We deal with the problem with two different techniques, on the one hand we use pure PDE methods
(comparison arguments) and on the other hand we use our game theoretical approach.
3.1. PDE arguments. We will use the eigenvalue problem associated with −λN (D
2u). For every
strictly convex domain there is a positive eigenvalue µ1, with an eigenfunction ψ1 that is positive
inside Ω and continuous up to the boundary with ψ1|∂Ω = 0 such that
(3.1)
{
−λN (D
2ψ1) = µ1ψ1, in Ω,
ψ1 = 0, on ∂Ω.
This eigenvalue problem was studied in [6]. Notice that ϕ1 = −ψ1 is a negative solution to
(3.2)
{
−λ1(D
2ϕ1) = µ1ϕ1, in Ω,
ϕ1 = 0, on ∂Ω.
We will use the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1. For any two symmetric matrices A, B, it holds that
(3.3) λ1(A) + λj(B) ≤ λj(A+B) ≤ λN (A) + λj(B).
Proof. Given a subspace S of dimension j, we have
sup
v∈S,|v|=1
〈Bv, v〉 + inf
|v|=1
〈Av, v〉 ≤ sup
v∈S,|v|=1
〈(A +B)v, v〉 ≤ sup
v∈S,|v|=1
〈Bv, v〉 + sup
|v|=1
〈Av, v〉.
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Hence, the first inequality follows from
λj(A+B) = inf
dim(S)=j
sup
v∈S,|v|=1
〈(A+B)v, v〉
≤ inf
dim(S)=j
sup
v∈S,|v|=1
〈Bv, v〉+ sup
|v|=1
〈Av, v〉
= λN (A) + λj(B)
and the second one from
λj(A+B) = inf
dim(S)=j
sup
v∈S,|v|=1
〈(A+B)v, v〉
≥ inf
dim(S)=j
sup
v∈S,|v|=1
〈Bv, v〉+ inf
|v|=1
〈Av, v〉
= λ1(A) + λj(B).
This ends the proof. 
Theorem 3.2. Let u0 be continuous with u0|∂Ω = g. Let ψR and ϕR be the eigenfunctions associ-
ated with µR the first eigenvalue for (3.1) and (3.2) in a large strictly convex domain ΩR such that
Ω ⊂⊂ ΩR. Then, there exist two positive constants C1, C2, depending on the initial condition u0,
such that
(3.4) z(x) + C1e
−µRtϕR(x) ≤ u(x, t) ≤ z(x) + C2e
−µRtψR(x).
Proof. We just observe that u(x, t) = z(x) + C1e
−µRtϕR(x) with C1 large enough is a subsolution
to our evolution problem in Ω. In fact, we have
ut(x, t) = −µRC1e
−µtϕR(x)
and
λ1(D
2u(x, t)) = λ1(D
2z(x) + C1e
−µRtD2ϕR(x))
≥ λ1(D
2z(x)) + C1e
−µRtλ1(D
2ϕR(x)) = −µC1e
−µRtϕR(x).
An analogous computation shows that u(x, t) = z(x) + C2e
−µRtψR(x) is a supersolution.
In addition, we have that
u(x, t) ≤ g(x) ≤ u(x, t), x ∈ ∂Ω, t > 0,
and for C1, C2 large enough (depending on u0)
u(x, 0) = z(x) + C1ϕR(x) ≤ u0(x) ≤ u(x, 0) = z(x) + C2ψR(x), x ∈ Ω.
Notice that here we are using that ϕR and ψR are strictly negative and strictly positive respectively
inside ΩR.
Finally we apply the comparison principle in Ω to obtain the desired conclusion
z(x) + C1e
−µRtϕR(x) ≤ u(x, t) ≤ z(x) + C2e
−µRtψR(x).

As an immediate consequence of this result we obtain that solutions to our evolution problem
converge uniformly to the convex envelope of the boundary condition. This proves Theorem 1.2.
Notice that in the previous result µ is the first eigenvalue for −λN (D
2u) in the larger domain
ΩR. Now, our aim is to obtain a sharper bound (involving µ1 the first eigenvalue in Ω). To this aim
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we have to assume that u0 is C
1(Ω) with u0|∂Ω = g and that the solution z of (1.2) is C
1(Ω). This
regularity of the solution of (1.2) up to the boundary is not included in [23] (there only interior
regularity for the convex envelope is shown). Under these hypotheses on u0 and z the difference
u0− z is C
1(Ω) and vanishes on ∂Ω. Notice that we do not know if there is a regularizing effect for
our evolution problem. That is, we do not know if for a smooth boundary datum and a continuous
initial condition the solution is smooth in Ω for any positive time t (as happens with solutions to
the heat equation).
As a previous step in our arguments, we need to show that the eigenfunctions have a ”negative
normal derivative”. Notice that the existence of such eigenfunction is proved in [5] for strictly
convex domains. Although this hypothesis is sufficient but not necessary (see [6] for construction
of eigenfunctions in rectangles), we shall assume it here since the optimal hypotheses for existence
of eigenfunctions are unknown (as far as we know). In the next two results we need to assume that
the domain Ω has some extra regularity (it has an interior tangent ball at every boundary point).
Lemma 3.3. Assume that Ω is strictly convex and has an interior tangent ball at every point of its
boundary. Let ϕ1 and ψ1 be the eigenfunctions associated with µ1 the first eigenvalue for (3.1) and
(3.2) in Ω. Assume that they are normalized with ‖ψ‖∞ = ‖ϕ‖∞ = 1. Then, there exists C > 0
such that
ψ1(x) ≥ C dist(x, ∂Ω) and ϕ1(x) ≤ −C dist(x, ∂Ω),
for x ∈ Ω.
Proof. Take x0 ∈ ∂Ω. LetBr(y) be a ball inside Ω, tangent to ∂Ω at x0. In Br/2(y) the eigenfunction
ψ1 is strictly positive and then we obtain that there exists a constant c such that
µ1ψ1(x) ≥ c, x ∈ Br/2(y).
Now, we take a(x) the solution to
(3.5)
{
−λN (D
2a(x)) = cχBr/2(y)(x), in Br(y),
a(x) = 0, on ∂Br(y).
This function a is radial a(x) = a(|x− y|) and can be explicitly computed. In fact,
a(x) =


c1(r − |x− y|), in Br(y) \Br/2(y),
c2 −
c
2
|x− y|2, in Br/2(y)
with c1, c2 such that c1 = cr/2 (continuity of the derivative at r/2) and c1r/2 = c2 − c/2(r/2)
2
(continuity of the function at r/2).
To conclude we use the comparison argument for (3.5) to obtain that
a(x) ≤ ψ1(x) x ∈ Br(y).
This implies that
ψ1(x) ≥ C dist(x, ∂Ω).
A similar argument shows that
ϕ1(x) ≤ −C dist(x, ∂Ω).

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Theorem 3.4. Assume that Ω is strictly convex and has an interior tangent ball at every point of
its boundary. Let g be such that the solution z of (1.2) is C1(Ω) and let u0 be C
1(Ω) with u0|∂Ω = g
and let µ1 the first eigenvalue for (3.1) and (3.2) in Ω. Then, there exist two positive constants
(depending on the initial condition u0) such that
(3.6) z(x) + C1e
−µ1tϕ1(x) ≤ u(x, t) ≤ z(x) + C2e
−µ1tψ1(x).
Proof. We just observe that the arguments used in the proof of Theorem 3.2 also work here since
we can find two constants C1 and C2 such that
(3.7) z(x) + C1ϕ1(x) ≤ u0(x) ≤ z(x) + C2ψ1(x), x ∈ Ω.
Here we are using that u0 − z is C
1(Ω) with (u0 − z)|∂Ω = 0 to get that there is a constant C such
that
−C dist(x, ∂Ω) ≤ (u0 − z)(x) ≤ C dist(x, ∂Ω),
and observe that from our previous Lemma 3.3 we obtain (3.7). 
We next give the proof of Theorem 1.3, which is a refined description of the asymptotic behavior
of the solution to (1.1) when the boundary datum g comes from the restriction of an affine function
to ∂Ω. For instance, if we consider the case j = 1, it shows that there exists a finite time T > 0
beyond which the upper estimate in (3.4) can be reduced to z(x), the λj−envelope of g inside Ω.
Proof of Theorem 1.3. We assume that there is an affine function (a plane if we are in the case
N = 2) pi such that g = pi|∂Ω. In this case the λj−envelope z of g inside Ω is given by
z(x) = pi(x).
Hence, let us consider
uˆ(x, t) = u(x, t)− z(x) = u(x, t)− pi(x).
This function uˆ is the viscosity solution to
(3.8)


uˆt − λj(D
2uˆ) = 0, in Ω× (0,+∞),
uˆ = 0, on ∂Ω× (0,+∞),
uˆ(x, 0) = u0(x) − z(x), in Ω.
For 1 ≤ j ≤ N − 1, we consider a large ball BR with Ω ⊂ BR. Inside this ball we take
w(x, t) = eR
2µe−µte−µ
r2
2 .
For large µ, this function w verifies
(3.9)


wt − λ1(D
2w) = −µeR
2µe−µte−µ
r2
2 + µeR
2µe−µte−µ
r2
2 = 0, in Ω× (0,+∞),
w > 0, on ∂Ω× (0,+∞),
w(x, 0) = eR
2µe−µ
r2
2 ≥ u0(x) − z(x), in Ω.
Hence, w is a supersolution to (3.8) and then, by the comparison principle, we get
uˆ(x, t) ≤ w(x, t) = eR
2µe−µte−µ
r2
2 ,
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for every µ large enough. Then, for every t > T = R2/2 we get
uˆ(x, t) ≤ lim
µ→∞
eR
2µe−µte−µ
r2
2 = 0.
Hence, we have shown that when the boundary condition is the restriction of an affine function
to the boundary, then there exists a finite time T such that the solution to the evolution problem
lies below the stationary solution z, regardless the initial condition u0, that is, it holds that
u(x, t) ≤ z(x)
for every x ∈ Ω and every t < T for 1 ≤ j ≤ N − 1.
For 2 ≤ j ≤ N the same argument proves that there exists a finite time T such that the solution
to the evolution problem lies above the stationary solution. Hence for 2 ≤ j ≤ N − 1 there exists a
finite time T such that the solution to the evolution problem coincides with the stationary solution.
This proves Theorem 1.3. 
Observe that for j = 1, u(x, t) = e−µ1tϕ1(x) is a solution to the problem that do not become
zero in finite time. The same holds for u(x, t) = e−µ1tψ1(x) for j = N . Our next result shows that,
in general, we can not expect that all solutions lie below z in the whole Ω in finite time.
Theorem 3.5. Let Ω be an open bounded domain in RN , and let 1 ≤ j ≤ N . For any x0 ∈ Ω,
there exist g and u0 continuous in ∂Ω and Ω respectively, with u0|∂Ω = g, such that the solution of
problem (1.1) satisfies
u(x0, t) ≥ z(x0) + ke
−µ1t, for all t > 0,
where µ1, k > 0 are two constants and z is the solution of (1.2).
We can obtain the analogous result for the inequality
u(x0, t) ≤ z(x0)− ke
−µ1t.
Proof. Consider, without loss of generality, that x0 ∈ Ω is the origin. Take r > 0 small enough such
that the ball Br of radius r and center at the origin satisfies Br ⊂⊂ Ω.
In the rest of the proof we will denote RN = Rj × RN−j , and we will write any point in RN as
x = (x′, x′′) ∈ Rj × RN−j .
Consider Bjr = Br ∩ {x
′′ = 0}. We observe that Bjr is a j−dimensional ball. Therefore, as it is
proven in [6], there exists a positive eigenvalue µ1, with an eigenfunction ψ1 which is continuous
up to the boundary, such that 

−λj(D
2ψ1) = µ1ψ1 in B
j
r ,
ψ1 = 0 on ∂B
j
r ,
ψ1 > 0 in B
j
r .
Consider g a nonnegative continuous function defined on ∂Ω such that
(3.10) g(x′, x′′) ≥ ψ1(x
′), for all (x′, x′′) ∈ ∂Ω, with x′ ∈ Bjr ,
and
(3.11) g(x′, 0) = 0 for all (x′, 0) ∈ ∂Ω ∩ {x′′ = 0}.
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We note that this choice of g is always possible since, if x′ ∈ Bjr , then (x
′, 0) ∈ Br, and since have
considered Br ⊂⊂ Ω, we deduce (x
′, 0) 6∈ ∂Ω.
For this choice of g, we claim that the solution of problem (1.2) satisfies
z(x′, x′′) = 0, in Ω ∩ {x′′ = 0}.
In order to prove this claim, we use the geometric interpretation of solutions to problem (1.2)
given in [7]. Consider the j−dimensional subspace {x′′ = 0}, and the j−dimensional domain
D := Ω ∩ {x′′ = 0}. Following the ideas of [7], the solution z of (1.2) must satisfy
z ≤ zD, in D,
where zD is the concave envelope of g in D = Ω ∩ {x
′′ = 0}. By the choice of g, using (3.11), it
follows that zD ≡ 0. The claim then follows from the maximum principle, since g ≥ 0 in ∂Ω. In
particular, we have
z(0) = 0.
Now, take u0 a nonnegative continuous function in Ω satisfying u0|∂Ω = g and
(3.12) u0(x
′, x′′) ≥ ψ1(x
′) for all (x′, x′′) ∈ Ω, with x′ ∈ Bjr .
Consider the following function defined in the subdomain Q :=
(
Ω ∩ {x′ ∈ Bjr}
)
× [0,+∞):
u(x′, x′′, t) := ψ1(x
′)e−µ1t.
We have
ut(x
′, x′′, t) = −µ1ψ1(x
′)e−µ1t,
λj(D
2u(x′, x′′, t)) = −µ1ψ1(x
′)e−µ1t,
u(x′, x′′, t) ≤ ψ1(x
′),
in Q. By (3.10) and (3.12), together with the comparison principle, we get
u(x′, x′′, t) ≤ u(x′, x′′, t), in Q,
and since z(0) = 0, we have
u(0, t) ≥ z(0) + ψ1(0)e
−µ1t, for all t > 0.

3.2. Probabilistic arguments. Here we will argue relating the value for our game and the value
for the game a random walk for λj introduced in [7]. We call z
ε(x0) the value of the game for the
elliptic case (see [7]) considering the initial position x0 and a length step of ε. This game is the
same as the one described in Section 2 but now we do not take into account the time, that is, we do
not stop when tk < 0 (and therefore we do not have that the number of plays is a priori bounded
by
⌈
2T/ε2
⌉
). We will call xτ 6∈ Ω the final position of the token. In what follows we will refer to
the game described in Section 2 as the parabolic game while when we disregard time we refer to
the elliptic game. Notice that the elliptic DPP is given by
 v
ε(x) = inf
dim(S)=j
sup
v∈S,|v|=1
{
1
2
vε
(
x+ εv
)
+
1
2
vε
(
x− εv
)}
x ∈ Ω,
vε(x) = g(x) x 6∈ Ω.
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Solutions to this DPP are stationary solutions (solutions independent of time) for the DPP that
correspond to the parabolic game. Let us recall it here,

uε(x, t) = inf
dim(S)=j
sup
v∈S,|v|=1
{
1
2
uε
(
x+ εv, t−
ε2
2
)
+
1
2
uε
(
x− εv, t−
ε2
2
)}
(x, t) ∈ ΩT ,
uε(x, t) = h(x, t) (x, t) 6∈ ΩT .
Here we choose h in such a way that it does not depend on t (we can do this since we are assuming
that g does not depend on t).
Our goal will be to show that there exist two positive constants µ, depending only on Ω, and C,
depending on u0, but both independent of ε, such that
‖uε(·, t)− vε(·)‖∞ ≤ Ce
−µt.
For the elliptic game, the strategies are denoted by S˜I and S˜II. Given two strategies for the
elliptic game, we can play the parabolic game according to those strategies by considering, for all
t0 > 0,
(3.13)
SI(t0, x0, x1, . . . , xk) = S˜I(x0, x1, . . . , xk)
SII(t0, x0, x1, . . . , xk, S) = S˜II(x0, x1, . . . , xk, S).
When we attempt to do the analogous construction, building a strategy for the elliptic game
given one for the parabolic game, we require that the game sequences are not too long since the
strategies for the parabolic game are only defined for tk > 0 (when tk ≤ 0 the parabolic game
ends). However, for any t > 0, if we suppose that the game ends in less than
⌈
2t/ε2
⌉
steps, i.e.
τ <
⌈
2t/ε2
⌉
, then we have a bijection between strategies for the two games that have the same
probability distribution for the game histories (x0, x1, . . . , xτ ).
The next lemma ensures that, in the parabolic game, the probability of the final payoff being
given by the initial data goes to 0 exponentially fast when t→ +∞. In addition, we also prove that
in the elliptic game, trajectories that take too long to exit the domain have exponentially small
probability.
Lemma 3.6. Let Ω be a bounded domain, SI , SII two strategies for the parabolic game and S˜I , S˜II
two strategies for the elliptic game. We have, for any t > 0,
P
x0,t
SI ,SII
[tτ ≤ 0] ≤ Ce
−µt and Px0
S˜I ,S˜II
[
ε2τ
2
≥ t
]
≤ Ce−µt
where µ > 0 is a constant depending only on Ω and C is another constant independent on the size
of the steps, ε. We recall that τ denotes the number of steps until the game ends.
Proof. Take BR(x) such that Ω ⊂ BR(x). We start by proving the estimate for the elliptic game.
Let S˜I , S˜II be two strategies for this game. As computed in (2.5),
Mk = |xk − x|
2 − ε2k
is a martingale. By applying the optional stopping theorem, we obtain
ε2Ex0
S˜I ,S˜II
[τ ] = Ex0
S˜I ,S˜II
[|xτ − x|
2] ≤ R2.
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Hence, we get
E
x0
S˜I ,S˜II
[
ε2τ
2
]
≤
R2
2
and we can show the bound
P
x0
S˜I ,S˜II
[
ε2τ
2
≥ t
]
≤
R2
2t
.
For n ∈ N by considering the martingale starting after n steps, we can obtain
P
x0
S˜I ,S˜II
[
ε2τ
2
≥
ε2
2
n+ t
∣∣∣ε2τ
2
≥
ε2
2
n
]
≤
R2
2t
.
Hence, for n, k ∈ N, applying this bound multiple times we obtain
P
x0
S˜I ,S˜II
[
ε2τ
2
≥
ε2
2
nk
]
= Px0
S˜I ,S˜II
[
ε2τ
2
≥
ε2
2
nk
∣∣∣ε2τ
2
≥
ε2
2
n(k − 1)
]
× Px0
S˜I ,S˜II
[
ε2τ
2
≥
ε2
2
n(k − 1)
∣∣∣ε2τ
2
≥
ε2
2
n(k − 2)
]
× · · · × Px0
S˜I ,S˜II
[
ε2τ
2
≥
ε2
2
n
]
≤
(
R2
2( ε
2n
2 )
)k
.
For ε < ε0 = 1 we consider
δ =
R2
2e−1
+
1
2
.
We have
P
x0
S˜I ,S˜II
[
ε2τ
2
≥ t
]
≤ Px0
S˜I ,S˜II
[
ε2τ
2
≥
ε2
2
⌊
δ2
ε2
⌋⌊
t
δ
⌋]
.
By the above argument we obtain
P
x0
S˜I ,S˜II
[
ε2τ
2
≥ t
]
≤
(
R2
2
⌊
δ2
ε2
⌋
ε2
2
)⌊ tδ⌋
≤
(
R2
2(δ −
ε2
0
2 )
) t
δ−1
= e−
t
δ+1.
We have shown
P
x0
S˜I ,S˜II
[
ε2τ
2
≥ t
]
≤ Ce−µt
for C = e and µ = 1δ . The same bound holds for the parabolic game, using the relation between
the strategies given in (3.13). That is,
P
x0,t
SI ,SII
[tτ ≤ 0] = P
x0,t
SI ,SII
[
ε2τ
2
≥ t
]
= 1− Px0,tSI ,SII
[
τ <
2t
ε2
]
= 1− Px0
S˜I ,S˜II
[
τ <
2t
ε2
]
≤ Ce−µt.
The use of the equivalence (3.13) between strategies of the two games is justified because we are
computing the probability of the number of steps being less than
⌈
2t/ε2
⌉
. 
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Using Lemma 3.6, we are able to prove that, as happens for the evolution PDE (see the previous
subsection), also in the game formulation, the asymptotic behaviour of the value function as t goes
to infinity is given by the value of the elliptic game (that is, by the stationary solution of the
game). Notice that in the probabilistic approach we obtain a bound for ‖u(·, t) − z(·)‖∞ of the
form C‖u0‖∞e
−µt. However, we do not have that µ comes from an eigenvalue problem but from
the exponential bounds obtained in Lemma 3.6.
Proposition 3.7. There exists µ > 0, a constant depending only on Ω, and C > 0 depending on
u0, such that
‖uε(·, t)− vε(·)‖∞ ≤ Ce
−µt,
where uε and vε are the value functions for the parabolic and the elliptic game, respectively.
Moreover, as a consequence of this exponential decay, we obtain that the solution u of the problem
(1.1) and the convex envelope z(x) of g in Ω satisfy
‖u(·, t)− z(·)‖∞ ≤ Ce
−µt.
Proof. Recall the payoff function h defined in (2.3), here do not depend on t. For any (x0, t0) ∈
Ω× (0,+∞) fixed, we have
(3.14)
uε(x0, t0) = inf
SI
sup
SII
E
x0,t0
SI ,SII
[
h(xτ , tτ )
]
= inf
SI
sup
SII
{
E
x0,t0
SI ,SII
[
g(xτ )|tτ > 0
]
P
x0,t0
SI ,SII
(tτ > 0)
+ Ex0,t0SI ,SII
[
u0(xτ )|tτ ≤ 0
]
P
x0,t0
SI ,SII
(tτ ≤ 0)
}
≤ inf
SI
sup
SII
E
x0,t0
SI ,SII
[
g(xτ )|tτ > 0
]
+ (‖g‖∞ + ‖u0‖∞) sup
SI,SII
P
x0,t0
SI ,SII
(tτ ≤ 0)
and
(3.15) u
ε(x0, t0) ≥ inf
SI
sup
SII
E
x0,t0
SI ,SII
[
g(xτ )|tτ > 0
]
− (‖g‖∞ + ‖u0‖∞) sup
SI,SII
P
x0,t0
SI ,SII
(tτ ≤ 0).
Now, let zε(x0) be the value of the elliptic game considering as payoff function the same function
g as before. We have
(3.16)
zε(x0) = inf
S˜I
sup
S˜II
{
E
x0
S˜I ,S˜II
[
g(xτ )|τ < 2t0/ε
2
]
P
x0
S˜I ,S˜II
(τ < 2t0/ε
2)
+ Ex0
S˜I ,S˜II
[
g(xτ )|τ ≥ 2t0/ε
2
]
P
x0
S˜I ,S˜II
(τ ≥ 2t0/ε
2)
}
≤ inf
S˜I
sup
S˜II
E
x0
S˜I ,S˜II
[
g(xτ )|τ < 2t0/ε
2
]
+ ‖g‖∞ sup
S˜I ,S˜II
P
x0
S˜I ,S˜II
(τ ≥ t0/ε
2).
and
(3.17) z
ε(x0) ≥ inf
S˜I
sup
S˜II
E
x0
S˜I ,S˜II
[
g(xτ )|τ < 2t0/ε
2
]
− ‖g‖∞ sup
S˜I ,S˜II
P
x0
S˜I ,S˜II
(τ ≥ t0/ε
2).
Given t0 > 0 in the parabolic game, if we suppose that τ < 2t0/ε
2 in both games, we have
an equivalence between the strategies of both games, regardless what happens after step
⌊
2t0/ε
2
⌋
.
That is,
inf
S˜I
sup
S˜II
E
x0
S˜I ,S˜II
[
g(xτ )|τ < 2t0/ε
2
]
= inf
SI
sup
SII
E
x0,t0
SI ,SII
[
g(xτ )|tτ > 0
]
.
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Now, combining (3.14), (3.15), (3.16) and (3.17), we obtain
(3.18) |uε(x0, t0)− z
ε(x0)| ≤ 2‖u0‖∞
(
sup
S˜I ,S˜II
P
x0
S˜I ,S˜II
(τ ≥ 2t0/ε
2) + sup
SI,SII
P
x0,t0
SI ,SII
(tτ ≤ 0)
)
.
Applying Lemma 3.6, for ε < ε0 = 1, we have
|uε(x0, t0)− z
ε(x0)| ≤ 4‖u0‖∞Ce
−µt0 ,
for some µ depending only on Ω. Letting ε → 0 and using the uniform convergence of uε(x0, t0)
and zε(x0) to u(x0, t0) and z(x0), respectively, we obtain
|u(x0, t0)− z(x0)| ≤ 4‖u0‖∞Ce
−µt0 .
This completes the proof. 
Now, assume that there is an affine function pi such that g = pi for x 6∈ Ω. In this case, we have
that pi(xk) is a martingale. Hence, under a strategy that forces the game to end outside Ω, we
obtain that Ex0,t0SI ,SII [h(xτ , tτ )] = pi(x0).
Suppose 1 ≤ j ≤ N − 1, Ω ⊂ BR(x) and g ≡ pi. Player I can choose S at every step in such a
way that it is normal to x− xk, hence v ∈ S is normal to x− xk, we have
|x− xk+1|
2 = |x− xk − vε|
2 = |vε|2 + |x− xk|
2 = ε2 + |x− xk|
2.
If Player I plays with this strategy, we obtain |x − xk|
2 = kε2 + |x − x0|
2. Since Ω ⊂ BR(x),
|x− xk|
2 ≤ R2 for every xk ∈ Ω, and hence the game ends after at most
R2 − |x− x0|
2
ε2
turns. Hence, it holds that
u(x, t) ≤ pi(x)
for every x ∈ Ω and every t > T = 2R2.
Analogously, if 2 ≤ j ≤ N , Player II can choose v ∈ S such that v is normal to x− xk (because
the intersection of S and the N − 1 dimensional normal space to x−xk is not empty). By the same
arguments used before, we can show that
u(x, t) ≥ pi(x)
for every x ∈ Ω and every t > T = 2R2.
Hence, we have shown that, for 2 ≤ j ≤ N − 1
u(x, t) = pi(x)
for every x ∈ Ω and every t > T = 2R2. Note that this argument can be considered as a proof of
Theorem 1.3 based on the game strategies.
We can obtain a similar result when g = pi in a half-space. Suppose that h = pi for every
x ∈ {x ∈ Ωc : x · w > θ} for a given w ∈ RN of norm 1 and θ ∈ R. Given y ∈ {x ∈ Ω : x · w > θ}
we can choose ξ ∈ RN and r > 0 such that {x ∈ Ω : x · w ≤ θ} ⊂ Br(ξ) and y 6∈ Br(ξ) as depicted
in Figure 1.
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w
h = piy·
Figure 1. Here ∂Ω is in red and ∂Br(ξ) in blue.
Now, arguing in the same way as before, we can consider the strategies that give a vector v
normal to xk − ξ. Hence, in the case 1 ≤ j ≤ N − 1 we can prove that
u(x, t) ≤ pi(x)
for every y ∈ {x ∈ Ω : x · w > θ} and every t large enough (for instance we can take t > 2r2 where
r is the radius of the ball described before, that depends on x). Note that the closer is y to the
hyperplane x · w = θ, the longer we will have to wait for having the above inequality.
In the case 2 ≤ j ≤ N , with analogous arguments, we can also show that we have the reverse
inequality, that is,
u(x, t) ≥ pi(x)
for every x ∈ {x ∈ Ω : x · w > θ} and every t large enough.
Next, we present an example that illustrates the result of Theorem 3.5. Although it is possible
to give a more general argument, giving rise to an alternative proof of this theorem based only on
probabilistic arguments, we restrict ourselves to this example to clarify the exposition.
Example 1. Consider the parabolic game for λj in a ball BR centered at the origin, and take as
initial and boundary data two functions u0(x
′, x′′) and g(x′, x′′), with (x′, x′′) ∈ Rj × RN−j , such
that
u0 > 0, in Ω, and g(x
′, x′′) = |x′′|, for all (x′, x′′) ∈ RN \ Ω.
For this choice of g, we claim that the solution of problem (1.2) satisfies
z(x′, x′′) = 0, in Ω ∩ {x′′ = 0}.
In order to prove this claim, we use the geometric interpretation of solutions to problem (1.2)
given in [7]. Consider the j−dimensional subspace {x′′ = 0}, and the j−dimensional domain
D := Ω ∩ {x′′ = 0}. Following the ideas of [7], the solution z of (1.2) must satisfy
z ≤ zD, in D,
where zD is the concave envelope of g in D = Ω ∩ {x
′′ = 0}. By the choice of g, it follows that
zD ≡ 0. The claim then follows from the maximum principle, since g ≥ 0 in ∂Ω.
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Now, let us prove that for any x0 ∈ Ω ∩ {x
′′ = 0} and t0 > 0, we have
uε(x0, t0) = inf
SI
sup
SII
E
x0,t0
SI ,SII
[
h(xτ , tτ )
]
> 0.
Let x0 ∈ Ω ∩ {x
′′ = 0}. Since u0 ≥ 0, if u
ε(x0, t0) = 0, Player I should have a strategy such
that whatever Player II does, the final payoff is 0 with probability 1. Since u0 vanishes only on
∂Ω∩ {x′′ = 0}, Player I needs to make sure that xk reaches this set before the game comes to end.
We claim that the only strategy Player I can follow is to choose the j−dimensional subspace
{x′′ = 0} at every step. Indeed, if at some step, xk leaves this subspace, the probability of never
coming back, and then the final payoff being non-zero, is positive.
Once Player I has fixed this only possible strategy to obtain zero as final payoff, Player II can
choose any unitary vector in the subspace {x′′ = 0}, and plays always with the same vector. Playing
with these strategies, the game is reduced to a random walk in a segment, and it is well known that
for this process, the probability of not reaching the extremes of the segment in less than
⌈
2t0/ε
2
⌉
steps is strictly positive for any t0 > 0 (in fact, it is uniformly bounded below). Since the initial
condition verifies u0 > 0 in Ω, we conclude that the value of the game is also strictly positive at
(x0, t0), moreover, it is bounded below, u
ε(x0, t0) > c > 0, for any x0 ∈ Ω ∩ {x
′′ = 0} and t0 > 0
independently of ε. Then, uε(x0, t0), and hence its limit as ε→ 0, u(x0, t0), does not lie below the
stationary solution z in finite time.
Finally, notice that from our previous arguments, we have that for any point x0 ∈ Ω \ {x
′′ = 0}
there is a finite time t0 (that depends on x0) such that u
ε(x0, t) = z(x0) for every t ≥ t0.
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